

every Nietzschean. Here he must show whether he has understood or failed to recognise the true sense of the tragic.

2

Active and Reactive

1. The Body

Spinoza suggested a new direction for the sciences and philosophy. He said that we do not even know what a body can do, we talk about consciousness and spirit and chatter on about it all, but we do not know what a body is capable of, what forces belong to it or what they are preparing for.' Nietzsche knew that the hour had come, "We are in the phase of modesty of consciousness" (VP II 261/WP 676). To remind consciousness of its necessary modesty is to take it for what it is: a symptom; nothing but the symptom of a deeper transformation and of the activities of entirely non-spiritual forces. "Perhaps the body is the only factor in all spiritual development." What is consciousness? Like Freud, Nietzsche thinks that consciousness is the region of the ego affected by the external world (VP II 253/WP 524, GS 357). However, consciousness is defined less in relation to exteriority (in terms of the real) than in relation to *superiority* (in terms of values). This distinction is essential to a general conception of consciousness and the unconscious. In Nietzsche consciousness is always the consciousness of an inferior in relation to a superior to which he is subordinated or into which he is "incorporated". Consciousness is never self-consciousness, but the consciousness of an ego in relation to a self which is not itself conscious. It is not the master's consciousness but the slave's consciousness in relation to a master who is not himself conscious. "Consciousness usually only appears when a whole wants to subordinate itself to a superior whole . . . Consciousness is born in relation to a being of which we could be a function" (VP II 227). This is the servility of consciousness; it merely testifies to the "formation of a superior body".

What is the body? We do not define it by saying that it is a field of forces, a nutrient medium fought over by a plurality of forces. For in fact there is no "medium", no field of forces or battle. There is no

quantity of reality, all reality is already quantity of force. There are nothing but quantities of force in mutual "relations of tension" (VP II 373/WP 635). Every force is related to others and it either obeys or commands. What defines a body is this relation between dominant and dominated forces. Every relationship of forces constitutes a body — whether it is chemical, biological, social or political. Any two forces, being unequal, constitute a body as soon as they enter into a relationship. This is why the body is always the fruit of chance, in the Nietzschean sense, and appears as the most "astonishing" thing, much more astonishing, in fact, than consciousness and spirit.² But chance, the relation of force with force, is also the essence of force. The birth of a living body is not therefore surprising since every body is living, being the "arbitrary" product of the forces of which it is composed.³ Being composed of a plurality of irreducible forces the body is a multiple phenomenon, its unity is that of a multiple phenomenon, a "unity of domination". In a body the superior or dominant forces are known as *active* and the inferior or dominated forces are known as *reactive*. Active and reactive are precisely the original qualities which express the relation of force with force. Because forces which enter into relation do not have quantity without each of them having, at the same time, the quality corresponding to their difference in quantity as such. This difference between forces qualified according to their quantity as active or reactive will be called hierarchy.

2) The Distinction of Forces

Inferior forces do not, by obeying, cease to be forces distinct from those which command. Obeying is a quality of force as such and relates to power just as much as commanding does: "individual power is by no means surrendered. In the same way, there is in commanding an admission that the absolute power of the opponent has not been vanquished, incorporated, disintegrated. 'Obedience' and 'commanding' are forms of struggle." (VP II 91/WP 642) Inferior forces are defined as reactive; they lose nothing of their force, of their quantity of force, they exercise it by securing mechanical means and final ends, by fulfilling the conditions of life and the functions and tasks of conversation, adaptation and utility. This is the point of departure for a concept whose importance in Nietzsche will be seen below, the

concept of reaction: the mechanical and utilitarian accommodations, the *regulations* which express all the power of inferior and dominated forces. Here we must note the immoderate taste of modern thought for this reactive aspect of forces. We always think that we have done enough when we understand an organism in terms of reactive forces. The nature of reactive forces and their quivering fascinates us. This is why we oppose mechanical means to final ends in the theory of life; but these two interpretations are only valid for reactive forces themselves. It is true that we do understand the organism in terms of forces. But it is also true that we can only grasp reactive forces for what they are, that is as forces and not as mechanical means or final ends, if we relate them to what dominates them but is not itself reactive. "One overlooks the essential priority of the spontaneous, aggressive, expansive, form-giving forces that give new interpretations and directions, although "adaptation" follows only after this; the dominant role of the highest functionaries within the organism itself. . . is denied" (GM II 12).

It is no doubt more difficult to characterise these active forces for, by nature, they escape consciousness, "The great activity is unconscious" (VP II 227). Consciousness merely expresses the relation of certain reactive forces to the active forces which dominate them. Consciousness is essentially reactive; this is why we do not know what a body can do, or what activity it is capable of (GS 354). And what is said of consciousness must also be said of memory and habit. Furthermore we must also say it of nutrition, reproduction, conservation and adaptation. These are reactive functions, reactive specialisations, expressions of particular reactive forces (VP II 43, 45, 187, 390/WP 167, 473, 657, 660). It is inevitable that consciousness sees the organism from its own point of view and understands it in its own way; that is to say, reactively. What happens is that science follows the paths of consciousness, relying entirely on *other* reactive forces; the organism is always seen from the petty side, from the side of its reactions. The problem of the organism, according to Nietzsche, is not an issue between mechanism and vitalism. What is the value of vitalism as long as it claims to discover the specificity of life in the same reactive forces that mechanism interprets in another way? The real problem is the discovery of active forces without which the reactions themselves would not be forces.⁴ What makes the body superior to all reactions, particularly that reaction of the ego that is called consciousness, is the

activity of necessarily unconscious forces: "This entire phenomenon of the body is, from the intellectual point of view, as superior to our consciousness, to our spirit to our conscious ways of thinking, feeling and willing, as algebra is superior to the multiplication table" (VP II 226). The body's active forces make it a self and define the self as superior and astonishing: "A most powerful being, an unknown sage – he is called Self. He inhabits your body, he is your body" (Z I "Of the Despisers of the Body" p. 62*). The only true science is that of activity, but the science of activity is also the science of what is necessarily unconscious. The idea that science must follow in the footsteps of consciousness, in the same directions, is absurd. We can sense the morality in this idea. In fact there can only be science where there is no consciousness, where there can be no consciousness.

"What is active? – reaching out for power" (VP II 43/WP 657). Appropriating, possessing, subjugating, dominating – these are the characteristics of active force. To appropriate means to impose forms, to create forms by exploiting circumstances (BGE 259 and VP II 63/WP 647). Nietzsche criticises Darwin for interpreting evolution and chance within evolution in an entirely reactive way. He admires Lamarck because Lamarck foretold the existence of a truly active *plastic force*, primary in relation to adaptations: a force of metamorphosis. For Nietzsche, as for energetics, energy which is capable of transforming itself is called "noble". The power of transformation, the Dionysian power, is the primary definition of activity. But each time we point out the nobility of action and its superiority to reaction in this way we must not forget that reaction also designates a type of force. It is simply that reactions cannot be grasped or scientifically understood as forces if they are not related to superior forces – forces of *another type*. The reactive is a primordial quality of force but one which can only be interpreted as such in relation to and on the basis of the active.

3. Quantity and Quality

Forces have quantity, but they also have the quality which corresponds to their difference in quantity: the qualities of force are called "active" and "reactive". We can see that the problem of measuring forces will be delicate because it brings the art of qualitative interpretations into play. The problem is as follows:

1) Nietzsche always believed that forces were quantitative and had to be defined quantitatively. "Our knowledge, he says, has become scientific to the extent that it is able to employ number and measurement. The attempt should be made to see whether a scientific order of values could be constructed simply on a numerical and quantitative scale of force. All other 'values' are prejudices, naiveties and misunderstandings. They are everywhere reducible to this numerical and quantitative scale" (VP II 352/WP 710).

2) However Nietzsche was no less certain that a purely quantitative determination of forces remained abstract, incomplete and ambiguous. The art of measuring forces raises the whole question of interpreting and evaluating qualities. "Mechanistic interpretation⁷: desires nothing but quantities; but force is to be found in quality. Mechanistic theory can therefore only *describe* processes, not explain them" (VP II 46/WP 660 – for an almost identical text cf. II 187). "Might all quantities not be signs of quality? . . . The reduction of all qualities to quantities is nonsense" (VP II 343/WP 564).

Is there a contradiction between these two kinds of texts? If a force is inseparable from its quantity it is no more separable from the other forces which it relates to. Quantity itself is therefore inseparable from difference in quantity. Difference in quantity is the essence of force and of the relation of force to force. To dream of two equal forces, even if they are said to be of opposite senses is a coarse and approximate dream, a statistical dream in which the living is submerged but which chemistry dispels.⁸ Each time that Nietzsche criticises the concept of quantity we must take it to mean that quantity as an abstract concept always and essentially tends towards an identification, an equalisation of the unity that forms it and an annulment of difference in this unity. Nietzsche's reproach to every purely quantitative determination of forces is that it annuls, equalises or compensates for differences in quantity. On the other hand, each time he criticises quality we should take it to mean that qualities are nothing but the corresponding difference in quantity between two forces whose relationship is presupposed. In short, Nietzsche is never interested in the irreducibility of quantity to quality; or rather he is only interested in it secondarily and as a symptom. What interests him primarily, from the standpoint of quantity itself, is the fact that differences in quantity cannot be reduced to equality. Quality is distinct from quantity but only because it is that aspect of quantity that cannot be equalised, that cannot be

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equalised out in the difference between quantities. Difference in quantity is therefore, in one sense, the irreducible element of quantity and in another sense the element which is irreducible to quantity itself. Quality is nothing but difference in quantity and corresponds to it each time forces enter into relation. "We cannot help feeling that mere quantitative differences are something fundamentally distinct from quantity, namely that they are *qualities* which can no longer be reduced to one another" (VP II 108/WP 565). The remaining anthropomorphism in this text should be corrected by the Nietzschean principle that there is a subjectivity of the universe which is no longer anthropomorphic but cosmic (VP II 15). "To want to reduce all qualities to quantities is madness . . ."

By affirming chance we affirm the relation of *all* forces. And, of course, we affirm all of chance all at once in the thought of the eternal return. But all forces do not enter into relations all at once on their own account. Their respective power is, in fact, fulfilled by relating to a small number of forces. Chance is the opposite of *a continuum* (on the *continuum* cf. VP II 356). The encounters of forces of various quantities are therefore the concrete parts of chance, the affirmative parts of chance and, as such, alien to every law; the limbs of Dionysus. But, in this encounter, each force receives the quality which corresponds to its quantity, that is to say the attachment which actually fulfills its power. Nietzsche can thus say, in an obscure passage, that the universe presupposes "an absolute genesis of arbitrary qualities", but that the genesis of qualities itself presupposes a (relative) genesis of quantities (VP II 334). The fact that the two geneses are inseparable means that we can not abstractly calculate forces. In each case we have to concretely evaluate their respective quality and the nuance of this quality.

4. Nietzsche and Science

The problem of Nietzsche's relations to science has been badly put. It is claimed that these relations depend on the theory of the eternal return – as if Nietzsche was only interested in science insofar as it favoured the eternal return, and then only vaguely, and insofar as it was opposed to the eternal return took no further interest in it. This is not the case and the origin of Nietzsche's critical position in relation to science must be sought in an entirely different direction, although this

direction does open up a new viewpoint on the eternal return.

It is true that Nietzsche had little scientific skill or inclination. But what sets him apart from science is a propensity, a way of thinking. Rightly or wrongly Nietzsche believes that science, in the way it handles quantities always tends to equalise them, to make up for inequalities. Nietzsche, as critic of science, never invokes the rights of quality against quantity; he invokes the rights of difference in quantity against equality, of inequality against equalisation of quantities. Nietzsche imagines a "numerical and quantitative scale", but one in which the divisions are not multiples or factors of one another. What he attacks in science is precisely the scientific mania for seeking balances, the *utilitarianism* and *egalitarianism* proper to science.⁶ This is why his whole critique operates on three levels; against logical identity, against mathematical equality and against physical equilibrium. *Against the three forms of the undifferentiated* (these three forms have an essential place in VP I and II). According to Nietzsche science will inevitably fall short of and endanger the true theory of force.

What is the significance of this tendency to reduce quantitative differences? In the first place, it expresses the way in which science is part of the *nihilism* of modern thought. The attempt to deny differences is a part of the more general enterprise of denying life, depreciating existence and promising it a death ("heat" or otherwise) where the universe sinks into the undifferentiated. Nietzsche accuses the physical concepts of matter, weight and heat of being, in the final analysis, agents of an equalisation of quantities, principles of an "*adiaphoria*". It is in this sense that Nietzsche shows that science is part of the ascetic ideal and serves it in its own way (GM III 25). But we **must** also look for the instrument of nihilistic thought in science. The answer is that science, by inclination, understands phenomena in terms of reactive forces and interprets them from this standpoint. Physics is reactive in the same way as biology; things are always seen from the petty side, from the side of reactions. The instrument of nihilistic thought is the triumph of reactive forces.

This is also the principle behind nihilism's manifestations: reactive physics is a physics of *ressentiment*, reactive biology is a biology of *ressentiment*. But we do not yet know why *this* is the only motive of the reactive forces which aim to deny the difference between forces, or how it serves as the principle of *ressentiment*.

Science either affirms or denies the eternal return depending on its

standpoint. But the *mechanist* affirmation of the eternal return and its *thermodynamic* negation have something in common: the conservation of energy which is always interpreted so that quantities of energy not only have a constant sum but also cancel out their differences. In both cases we pass from a principle of finitude (the constancy of a sum) to a "nihilistic" principle (the cancelling out of differences in quantities, the sum of which is constant). The mechanist idea affirms the eternal return but only by assuming that differences in quantity balance or cancel each other out between the initial and final states of a reversible system. The final state is identical to the initial state which is itself assumed to be undifferentiated in relation to intermediate states. The thermodynamic idea denies the eternal return but only because it discovers that differences in quantity only cancel each other out in the final state of the system, as a function of the properties of heat. In this way identity is posited in the final undifferentiated state and opposed to the differentiation of the initial state. The two conceptions agree on one hypothesis, that of a final or terminal state, a terminal state of becoming. Being or nothing, being or non-being, are equally undifferentiated: the two conceptions come together in the idea of becoming having a final state, "In metaphysical terms, if becoming could end in being or nothing . . ." (VP II 329). This is why mechanism does not succeed in establishing the existence of the eternal return, any more than thermodynamics succeeds in denying it. Both pass it by and fall into the undifferentiated, fall back into the identical.

According to Nietzsche the eternal return is in no sense a thought of the identical but rather a thought of synthesis, a thought of the absolutely different which calls for a new principle outside science. This principle is that of the reproduction of diversity as such, of the repetition of difference; the opposite of "*adiaphoria*". (VP II 374 "There is no *adiaphoria* although we can imagine it.") And indeed, we fail to understand the eternal return if we make it a consequence or an application of identity. We fail to understand the eternal return if we do not oppose it to identity in a particular way. The eternal return is not the permanence of the same, the equilibrium state or the resting place of the identical. It is not the 'same' or the 'one' which comes back in the eternal return but return is itself the one which ought to belong to diversity and to that which differs.

5. First Aspect of the Eternal Return: as cosmological and physical doctrine

Nietzsche's account of the eternal return presupposes a critique of the terminal or equilibrium state. Nietzsche says that if the universe had an equilibrium position, if becoming had an end or final state, it would already have been attained. But the present moment, as the passing moment, proves that it is not attained and therefore that an equilibrium of forces is not possible (VP II 312, 322, 329–330). But why would equilibrium, the terminal state, have to have been attained if it were possible? By virtue of what Nietzsche calls the infinity of past time. The infinity of past time means that becoming cannot have started to become, that it is not something that has become. But, not being something that has become it cannot be a becoming something. Not having become, it would already be what it is becoming – if it were becoming something. That is to say, past time being infinite, becoming would have attained its final state if it had one. And, indeed, saying that becoming would have attained its final state if it had one is the same as saying that it would not have left its initial state if it had one. If becoming becomes something why has it not finished becoming long ago? If it is something which has become then how could it have started to become? "If the universe were capable of permanence and fixity, and if there were in its entire course a single moment of being in the strict sense it could no longer have anything to do with becoming, thus one could no longer think or observe any becoming whatever" (VP II 322; see an analogous text, VP II 330/WP 1062). This is the view that Nietzsche claims to have found "in earlier thinkers" (VP II 329/WP 1066). Plato said that if everything that becomes can never avoid the present then, as soon as it is there, it ceases to become and is then what it was in the process of becoming (Plato, *Parmenides*, cf. Second Hypothesis – however Nietzsche is thinking more of Anaximander). "But each time I encountered this thought from antiquity," Nietzsche comments, "it was determined by other, generally theological, ulterior motives." By persisting in demanding how becoming could have started and why it has not yet finished, the philosophers of antiquity are false tragics, invoking hubris, crime and punishment.' With the exception of Heraclitus, they did not face up to the thought of pure becoming, nor the

opportunity for this thought. That the present moment is not a moment of being or of present "in the strict sense", that it is the passing moment, forces us to think of becoming, but to think of it precisely as what could not have started, and cannot finish, becoming.

How does the thought of pure becoming serve as a foundation for the eternal return? All we need to do to think this thought is to stop believing in being as distinct from and opposed to becoming or to believe in the being of becoming itself. What is the being of that which becomes, of that which neither starts nor finishes becoming? Returning is the being of that which becomes (Revenir, *l'être de ce qui devient*). "That everything recurs is the closest approximation of a world of becoming to a world of being – high point of the meditation" (VP II 170/WP 617). This problem for the meditation must be formulated in yet another way; how can the past be constituted in time? How can the present pass? The passing moment could never pass if it were not already past and yet to come – at the same time as being present. If the present did not pass of its own accord, if it had to wait for a new present in order to become past, the past in general would never be constituted in time, and this particular present would not pass. We cannot wait, the moment must be simultaneously present and past, present and yet to come, in order for it to pass (and to pass for the sake of other moments). The present must coexist with itself as past and yet to come. The synthetic relation of the moment to itself as present, past and future grounds its relation to other moments. The eternal return is thus an answer to the problem of *passage*.⁸ And in this sense it must not be interpreted as the return of something that is, that is "one" or the "same". We misinterpret the expression "eternal return" if we understand it as "return of the same". It is not being that returns but rather the returning itself that constitutes being insofar as it is affirmed of becoming and of that which passes. It is not some one thing which returns but rather returning itself is the one thing which is affirmed of diversity or multiplicity. In other words, identity in the eternal return does not describe the nature of that which returns but, on the contrary, the fact of returning for that which differs. This is why the eternal return must be thought of as a synthesis; a synthesis of time and its dimensions, a synthesis of diversity and its reproduction, a synthesis of becoming and the being which is affirmed in becoming, a synthesis of double affirmation. Thus the eternal return itself does

not depend on a principle of identity but on one which must, in all respects, fulfill the requirements of a truly sufficient reason.

Why is mechanism such a bad interpretation of the eternal return? Because it does not necessarily or directly imply the eternal return. Because it only entails the false consequence of a final state. This final state is held to be identical to the initial state and, to this extent, it is concluded that the mechanical process passes through the same set of differences again. The cyclical hypothesis, so heavily criticised by Nietzsche (VP II 325 and 334), arises in this way. Because we cannot understand how this process can possibly leave the initial state, re-emerge from the final state, or pass through the same set of differences again and yet not even have the power to pass once through whatever differences there are. The cyclical hypothesis is incapable of accounting for two things – the diversity of co-existing cycles and, above all, the existence of diversity within the cycle.⁹ This is why we can only understand the eternal return as the expression of a principle which serves as an explanation of diversity and its reproduction, of difference and its repetition. Nietzsche presents this principle as one of his most important philosophical discoveries. He calls it will to power. By will to power "I express the characteristic that cannot be thought out of the mechanistic order without thinking away this order itself" (VP II 374/WP 634").

6. What is the Will to Power?

One of the most important texts which Nietzsche wrote to explain what he understood by will to power is the following: "The victorious concept 'force', by means of which our physicists have created God and the world, still needs to be completed: an inner will must be ascribed to it, which I designate as 'will to power'" (VP II 309/WP 619). The will to power is thus ascribed to force, but in a very special way: it is both a complement of force and something internal to it. It is not ascribed to it as a predicate. Indeed, if we pose the question "which one", we cannot say that force is the one that wills. The will to power alone is the one that wills, it does not let itself be delegated or alienated to another subject, even to force (VP I 204, II 54; "Who therefore will power? An absurd question, if being is by itself will to power . . .") But how then can it be "ascribed"? We must remember that every

force has an essential relation to other forces, that the essence of force is its quantitative difference from other forces and that this difference is expressed as the force's quality. Now, difference in quantity, understood in this way, necessarily reflects a differential element of related forces – which is also the genetic element of the qualities of these forces. This is what the will to power is; the genealogical element of force, both differential and genetic. *The will to power is the element from which derive both the quantitative difference of related forces and the quality that devolves into each force in this relation.* The will to power here reveals its nature as the principle of the synthesis of forces. In this synthesis – which relates to time – forces pass through the same differences again or diversity is reproduced. The synthesis is one of forces, of their difference and their reproduction; the eternal return is the synthesis which has as its principle the will to power. We should not be surprised by the word "will"; *which one* apart from the will is capable of serving as the principle of a synthesis of forces by determining the relation of force with forces? But how should the term "principle" be understood? Nietzsche always attacks principles for being too general in relation to what they condition, for always having too broad a mesh in relation to what they claim to capture or regulate. He likes to oppose the will to power to the Schopenhauerian will to live, if only because of the extreme generality of the latter. If, on the contrary, the will to power is a good principle, if it reconciles empiricism with principles, if it constitutes a superior empiricism, this is because it is an essentially *plastic* principle that is no wider than what it conditions, that changes itself with the conditioned and determines itself in each case along with what it determines. The will to power is, indeed, never separable from particular determined forces, from their quantities, qualities and directions. It is never superior to the ways that it determines a relation between forces, it is always plastic and **changing**.¹⁰

Inseparable does not mean identical. The will to power cannot be separated from force without falling into metaphysical abstraction. But to confuse force and will is even more risky. Force is no longer understood as force and one falls back into mechanism – forgetting the difference between forces which constitutes their being and remaining ignorant of the element from which their reciprocal genesis derives. Force is what can, will to power is what wills (*La force est ce qui peut, la volonté de puissance est ce qui veut*). What does this

distinction mean? The passage quoted above invites comment on every word. – The concept of force is, by nature, *victorious* because the relation of force to force, understood conceptually, is one of domination: when two forces are related one is dominant and the other is dominated. (Even God and the universe are caught in a relation of domination, however debatable the interpretation of such a relation may be in this case.) Nevertheless, this victorious concept of force needs a *complement* and this complement is *internal*, an internal will. It would not be victorious without such an addition. This is because relations of forces remain indeterminate unless an element which is capable of determining them from a double point of view is added to force itself. Forces in relation reflect a simultaneous double genesis: the reciprocal genesis of their difference in quantity and the absolute genesis of their respective qualities. The will to power is thus added to force, but as the differential and genetic element, as the *internal* element of its production. It is in no way anthropomorphic. More precisely, it is added to force as the internal principle of the determination of its quality in a relation ($x + dx$) and as the internal principle of the quantitative determination of this relation itself (dy/dx). The will to power must be described as the genealogical element of force *and* of forces. Thus it is always through the will to power that one force prevails over others and dominates or commands them. Moreover it is also the will to power (dy) which makes a force obey within a relation; it is through will to power that it obeys.¹¹

We have already encountered the relationship between the eternal return and the will to power, but we have neither elucidated nor analysed it. The will to power is both the genetic element of force and the principle of synthesis of forces. But we are not yet able to understand how this synthesis forms the eternal return, how the forces in it necessarily reproduce themselves in conformity with its principle. On the other hand, the existence of this problem reveals a historically important aspect of Nietzsche's philosophy; its complex relations with Kantianism. Kantianism centres on the concept of synthesis which it discovered. Now, we know that the post-Kantians reproached Kant, from two points of view, for having endangered this discovery: from the point of view of the principle which governs the synthesis and from the point of view of the reproduction of objects in the synthesis itself. They demanded a principle which was not merely conditioning in relation to objects but which was also truly genetic and

productive (a principle of eternal difference or determination). They also condemned the survival, in Kant, of miraculous harmonies between terms that remain external to one another. With regard to such a principle of internal difference or determination they demanded grounds not only for the synthesis but for the reproduction of diversity in the synthesis as such.^{12*} If Nietzsche belongs to the history of Kantianism it is because of the original way in which he deals with these post-Kantian demands. He turned synthesis into a synthesis of forces – for, if we fail to see synthesis in this way, we fail to recognise its sense, nature and content. He understood the synthesis of forces as the eternal return and thus found the reproduction of diversity at the heart of synthesis. He established the principle of synthesis, the will to power and determined this as the differential and genetic element of forces which directly confront one another. Although this supposition must be verified later we believe that there is, in Nietzsche, not only a Kantian heritage, but a half-avowed, half-hidden, rivalry. Nietzsche does not have the same position in relation to Kant as Schopenhauer did for, unlike Schopenhauer, he does not attempt an interpretation which would separate Kantianism from its dialectical avatars and present it with new openings. This is because, for Nietzsche, these dialectical avatars do not come from the outside but are primarily caused by the deficiencies of the critical philosophy. Nietzsche seems to have sought (and to have found in the "eternal return" and the "will to power") a radical transformation of Kantianism, a re-invention of the critique which Kant betrayed at the same time as he conceived it, a resumption of the critical project on a new basis and with new concepts.

7. Nietzsche's Terminology

We must now fix certain points in Nietzsche's terminology even if this anticipates analyses which remain to be done. All the rigour of his philosophy, whose systematic precision is wrongly suspected, depends on it. This suspicion is wrong in any case, whether this is cause for rejoicing or regret. In fact Nietzsche uses very precise new terms for very precise new concepts:

1) Nietzsche calls the genealogical element of force the will to power. Genealogical means differential and genetic. The will to power is the differential element of forces, that is to say the element that produces

the differences in quantity between two or more forces whose relation is presupposed. The will to power is the genetic element of force, that is to say the element that produces the quality due to each force in this relation. The will to power as a principle does not suppress chance but, on the contrary, implies it, because without chance it would be neither plastic nor changing. Chance is the bringing of forces into relation, the will to power is the determining principle of this relation. The will to power is a necessary addition to force but can only be added to forces brought into relation by chance. The will to power has chance at its heart for only the will to power is capable of affirming all chance.

2) The difference in quantity and the respective qualities of forces in relation both derive from the will to power as genealogical element. Forces are said to be dominant or dominated depending on their difference in quantity. Forces are said to be active or reactive depending on their quality. There is will to power in the reactive or dominated force as well as in the active or dominant force. Now, as the difference in quantity is irreducible in every case, it is pointless to want to measure it without interpreting the qualities of the forces which are present. Forces are essentially differentiated and qualified. They express their difference in quantity by the quality which is due to them. This is the problem of interpretation: to estimate the quality of force that gives meaning to a given phenomenon, or event, and from that to measure the relation of the forces which are present. We must not forget that, in every case, interpretation comes up against all kinds of delicate problems and difficulties; and "extremely fine" perception is necessary here, of the kind found in chemistry.

3) The principle of the qualities of force is the will to power. And if we ask: "which one interprets?", we reply *the will to power*; it is the will to power that interprets (VP I 204 and II 130/WP 556 and 643). But, in order to be the source of the qualities of force in this way, the will to power must itself have qualities, particularly fluent ones, even more subtle than those of force. "What rules is the entirely momentary quality of the will to power" (VP II 39). These qualities of the will to power which are immediately related to the genetic or genealogical element, these fluent, primordial and seminal qualitative elements, must not be confused with the qualities of force. It is therefore essential to insist on the terms used by Nietzsche; *active* and *reactive* designate the original qualities of force but *affirmative* and *negative*

designate the primordial qualities of the will to power. Affirming and denying, appreciating and depreciating, express the will to power just as acting and reacting express force. (And just as reactive forces are still forces, the will to deny, nihilism, is still will to power: ". . . a will to nothingness, an aversion to life, a rebellion against the most fundamental presuppositions of life; but it is and remains a will!" GM III 28 p. 163) This distinction between two kinds of quality is of the greatest importance and it is always found at the centre of Nietzsche's philosophy. There is a deep affinity, a complicity, but never a confusion, between action and affirmation, between reaction and negation. Moreover, the determination of these affinities brings the whole art of philosophy into play. On the one hand, it is clear that there is affirmation in every action and negation in every reaction. But, on the other hand, action and reaction are more like means, means or instruments of the will to power which affirms and denies, just as reactive forces are instruments of nihilism. And again, action and reaction need affirmation and negation as something which goes beyond them but is necessary for them to achieve their own ends. Finally, and more profoundly, affirmation and negation extend beyond action and reaction because they are the immediate qualities of becoming itself. Affirmation is not action but the power of becoming active, becoming active personified. Negation is not simple reaction but a becoming reactive. It is as if affirmation and negation were both immanent and transcendent in relation to action and reaction; out of the web of forces they make up the chain of becoming. Affirmation takes us into the glorious world of Dionysus, the being of becoming and negation hurls us down into the disquieting depths from which reactive forces emerge.

4) For all these reasons Nietzsche can say that the will to power is not only the one that interprets but the one that evaluates (VP II 29: "Every will implies an evaluation."). To interpret is to determine the force which gives sense to a thing. To evaluate is to determine the will to power which gives value to a thing. We can no more abstract values from the standpoint from which they draw their value than we can abstract meaning from the standpoint from which it draws its signification. The will to power as genealogical element is that from which senses derive their significance and values their value. It is what we were talking about, without using the name, at the beginning of the preceding chapter. The signification of a sense consists in the quality of

the force which is expressed in a thing: is this force active or reactive and of what nuance? The value of a value consists in the quality of the will to power expressed in the corresponding thing; is the will to power affirmative or negative and of what nuance? The art of philosophy becomes even more complicated as these problems of interpretation and evaluation refer back to and extend one another. What Nietzsche calls noble, high and master is sometimes active force, sometimes affirmative will. What he calls base, vile and slave is sometimes reactive force and sometimes negative will. Later we will understand why he uses these terms. But a value always has a genealogy on which the nobility or baseness of what it invites us to believe, feel and think depends. Only a genealogist is able to discover what sort of baseness can find its expression in one value, what sort of nobility in another, because only he knows how to handle the differential element: he is the master of the critique of values.¹³ The notion of value loses all meaning if values are not seen as receptacles to be pierced, statues to be broken open to find what they contain, whether it is the most noble or the most base. Like the scattered limbs of Dionysus only the statues of nobility come back together. Talk of the nobility of values in general shows a type of thought which has too much at stake to hide its own baseness – as if whole domains of values did not derive their sense and their value from serving as refuge and manifestation for all that is vile and slavish. Nietzsche, the creator of the philosophy of values, would have seen, if he had lived longer, his most critical notion serving and turning into the most insipid and base ideological conformism; the hammer strokes of the philosophy of values becoming strokes of flattery; polemic and aggression replaced by resentment, carping guardian of the established order, watchdog of current values. This is genealogy taken up by slaves – the forgetting of qualities, the forgetting of origins.¹⁴

8. Origin and Inverted Image

In the beginning, at the origin, there is the difference between active and reactive forces. Action and reaction are not in a relation of succession but in one of coexistence in the origin itself. Moreover, the complicity of active forces and affirmation and that of reactive forces and negation is revealed by the principle that the negative is already wholly on the side of reaction. Conversely, only active force asserts

itself, it affirms its difference and makes its difference an object of enjoyment and affirmation. Reactive force, even when it obeys, limits active force, imposes limitations and partial restrictions on it and is already controlled by the spirit of the negative (GM II 11). This is why the origin itself, in one sense, includes an inverted self-image; seen from the side of reactive forces the differential and genealogical element appears upside down, difference has become negation, affirmation has become contradiction. An inverted image of the origin accompanies the origin; "yes" from the point of view of active forces becomes "no" from the point of view of reactive forces and affirmation of the self becomes negation of the other. This is what Nietzsche calls the "inversion of the value-positing eye".¹⁵ Active forces are noble but they find themselves before a plebeian image, reflected in reactive forces. Genealogy is the art of difference or distinction, the art of nobility; but it sees itself upside down in the mirror of reactive forces. Its image then appears as that of an "evolution". – Sometimes this evolution is understood in the German manner, as a dialectical and Hegelian evolution, as the development of contradiction. Sometimes it is understood in the English manner, as a utilitarian derivation, as the development of profit and interest. But true genealogy is always caricatured in the essentially reactive image that evolution presents of it. Whether it is English or German, evolutionism, is the reactive image of genealogy.¹⁶ Thus it is characteristic of reactive forces to deny, from the start, the difference which constitutes them at the start, to invert the differential element from which they derive and to give a deformed image of it. "Difference breeds hatred" (BGE 263). This is why they do not see themselves as forces and prefer to turn against themselves rather than seeing themselves in this way and accepting difference. The "mediocrity" of thought which Nietzsche attacks always reflects a mania for interpreting or evaluating phenomena in terms of reactive forces – every nation chooses its own. But this mania has its origins at the beginning, in the inverted image. Consciousness and consciences are simply enlargements of this reactive image . . .

Going one step further, let us suppose that, with the help of favourable external or internal circumstances, reactive forces get the better of and neutralise active force. We have now left the origin: it is no longer a question of an inverted image but of a development of this image, an inversion of values themselves (GM I 7) so that the low is

placed on high and reactive forces have triumphed. If they do triumph it is through the negative will, through the will to nothingness which develops the image; but their triumph itself is not imaginary. The question is; how do reactive forces triumph? That is to say: when they get the better of active forces do reactive forces themselves also become dominant, aggressive and subjugating? Do they, by getting together, form a greater force that would then be active? Nietzsche's answer is that even by getting together reactive forces do not form a greater force, one that would be active. They proceed in an entirely different way – they decompose; they separate active force from what it can do; they take away a part or almost all of its power. In this way reactive forces do not become active but, on the contrary, they make active forces join them and become reactive in a new sense. We can see that, from its beginning and in developing itself, the concept of reaction changes in signification: an active force becomes reactive (in a new sense) when reactive forces (in the first sense) separate it from what it can do. Nietzsche will analyse how such a separation is possible in detail. But it is important to notice that, even at this stage, he is careful never to present the triumph of reactive forces as the putting together of a force superior to active force but, rather, as a subtraction or division. Nietzsche devotes a whole book to the analysis of the figures of reactive triumph in the human world – resentment, bad conscience and the ascetic ideal. In each case he shows that reactive forces do not triumph by forming a superior force but by "separating" active force (cf. the three essays of the GM). In each case this separation rests on a fiction, on a mystification or a falsification. It is the will to nothingness which develops the negative and inverted image and makes the subtraction. Now, there is always something imaginary in the operation of subtraction – as the negative utilisation of number shows. Thus if we want to give a numerical transcription of the victory of reactive forces we must not appeal to an addition by which reactive forces would, by getting together, become stronger than active force, but rather to a subtraction which separates active force from what it can do and denies its difference in order to make it a reactive force. Thus getting the better of action is not enough to stop reaction being reaction; on the contrary. Active force is separated from what it can do by a fiction but is not therefore any less "really" reactive, in fact, this is the way in which it becomes really reactive. This is where Nietzsche's use of the words "vile", "ignoble"

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and "slave" comes from – these words designate the state of reactive forces that place themselves on high and entice active force into a trap, replacing masters with slaves who do not stop being slaves.

9. *The Problem of the Measure of Forces*

This is why we cannot measure forces in terms of an abstract unity, or determine their respective quality and quantity by using the real state of forces in a system as a criterion. We have said that active forces are the superior, dominant and strongest forces. But inferior forces can prevail without ceasing to be inferior in quantity and reactive in quality, without ceasing to be slaves in this sense. One of the finest remarks in *The Will to Power* is: "The strong always have to be defended against the weak" (VP I 395). We cannot use the state of a system of forces as it in fact is, or the result of the struggle between forces, in order to decide which are active and which are reactive. Nietzsche remarks, against Darwin and evolutionism, "Supposing, however, that this struggle exists – and it does indeed occur – its outcome is the reverse of that desired by the school of Darwin, of that which one *ought* perhaps to desire with them: namely, the defeat of the stronger, the more privileged, the fortunate exceptions" (TI "Expeditions of an Untimely Man" 14 pp. 75–6). It is primarily in this sense that interpretation is such a difficult art – we must judge whether the forces which prevail are inferior or superior, reactive or active; whether they prevail as *dominated* or *dominant*. In this area there are no facts, only interpretations. The measurement of forces must not be conceived of as a procedure of abstract physics but rather as the fundamental act of a concrete physics, not as an indifferent technique but as the art of interpreting difference and quality independently of fact. (Nietzsche sometimes says; "Outside of the existing social order". VP III 8).

This problem reopens an old argument, a famous debate between Callicles and Socrates (*Gorgias*; discussion on "nature and convention", 481–527). The resemblance is so striking that it seems to us that Nietzsche is close to Callicles and that Callicles is immediately completed by Nietzsche. Callicles strives to distinguish nature and law. Everything that separates a force from what it can do he calls law. Law, in this sense, expresses the triumph of the weak over the strong. Nietzsche adds: the triumph of reaction over action. Indeed,

everything which separates a force is reactive as is the state of a force separated from what it can do. Every force which goes to the limit of its power is, on the contrary, active. It is not a law that every force goes to the limit, it is even the opposite of law.¹⁷ – Socrates replies to Callicles that there is no way of distinguishing nature and law; for the weak can only prevail if, by banding together, they can form a stronger force than the strong. Law triumphs from the point of view of nature itself. Callicles does not complain of not having been understood, he begins again. The slave does not stop being a slave by being triumphant; when the weak triumph it is not by forming a greater force but by separating force from what it can do. Forces must not be compared abstractly; from the point of view of nature concrete force is that which goes to its ultimate consequences, to the limit of power or desire. Socrates objects a second time; "what matters for you Callicles is pleasure . . . You define all good in terms of pleasure."

We can see here what happens between the sophist and the dialectician, on which side the good faith and the rigorous reasoning is. Callicles is aggressive but has no *ressentiment*. He prefers to give up talking because it is clear that Socrates does not understand the first time and the second time speaks of something else. How can he explain to Socrates that "desire" is not the association of a pleasure and a pain, the pain of experiencing it and the pleasure of satisfying it? How can he explain that pleasure and pain are reactions, properties of reactive forces, the proof of adaptation or lack of it? And how can Socrates be made to understand that the weak do not form a stronger force? Socrates has partially misunderstood and partially misheard – he is too full of dialectical *ressentiment* and the spirit of revenge. He who is so exacting towards others, so fastidious when they reply to him . . .

(10) *Hierarchy*

Nietzsche also encounters his own Socrates. These are the free thinkers. They say: "What are you complaining about? How could the weak have triumphed if they did not form superior force?" "Let us bow down before accomplished fact" (GM I 9). This is modern positivism. They claim to carry out the critique of values, they claim to refuse all appeals to transcendent values, they declare them unfashionable, but only in order to rediscover them as the forces

which run the world of today. The value of Church, morality, State etc. is only discussed so that their human force and content can be admired. The free thinker has the strange craze for recovering every content, everything positive, but without ever questioning the nature of these self-styled positives or the origin or quality of the corresponding human forces. This is what Nietzsche calls "fatalism" (GM III 24). The free thinker wants to recover the content of religion but never considers that religion might in fact contain man's basest forces, forces which we might want to leave behind. This is why we can have no confidence in the free thinker's atheism, even when he's a democrat and a socialist: "It is the church, and not its poison that repels us" (GM I 9 p. 36). The essential characteristics of the free thinker's positivism and humanism are fatalism, interpretative impotence and ignorance of the qualities of force. As soon as something appears as a human force or fact the free thinker applauds it without wondering whether this force is of base extraction, whether this fact is the opposite of a high fact: "Human all-too human". Because it does not take the qualities of forces into account free thought is, by vocation, at the service of reactive forces and expresses their triumph. For the fact is always something used by the weak against the strong; "the fact is always stupid, having at all times resembled a calf rather than a god" (UM II "Use and Abuse of History" 8). Nietzsche opposes the *free spirit* to the free thinker, the spirit of interpretation itself which judges forces from the standpoint of their origin and quality: "There are no facts, nothing but interpretations" (VP II 133). The critique of the free thinker is a fundamental theme in Nietzsche's work – because this critique discloses a perspective from which many different ideologies can be attacked at once; positivism, humanism, the dialectic – positivism's taste for facts, humanism's exaltation of the human fact and the dialectic's mania for recovering human contents.

In Nietzsche the word *hierarchy* has two senses. It signifies, firstly, the difference between active and reactive forces, the superiority of active to reactive forces. Nietzsche can thus speak of an "unalterable and innate order of rank in hierarchy" (BGE 263); and the problem of hierarchy is itself the problem of free spirits (HH Preface 7). But hierarchy also designates the triumph of reactive forces, the contagion of reactive forces and the complex organisation which results – where the weak have conquered, where the strong are contaminated, where the slave who has not stopped being a slave prevails over the master

who has stopped being one: the reign of law and of virtue. In this second sense morality and religion are still theories of hierarchy (VP III 385 and 391). If we compare the two senses we see that the second is like the reverse of the first. We make Church, morality and State the masters or keepers of all hierarchy. We have the hierarchy that we deserve, we who are essentially reactive, we who take the triumphs of reaction for a transformation of action and slaves for new masters – we who only recognise hierarchy back to front.

What Nietzsche calls weak or slavish is not the least strong but that which, whatever its strength, is separated from what it can do. The least strong is as strong as the strong if he goes to the limit, because the cunning, the subtlety, the wit and even the charm by which he makes up for his lesser strength are part of this strength so that it is no longer the least. (Zarathustra's two animals are the eagle and the serpent. The eagle is strong and proud but the serpent being crafty and charming is no less strong.) The measure of forces and their qualification does *not* depend on absolute quantity but rather on relative accomplishment. Strength or weakness cannot be judged by taking the result and success of struggle as a criterion. For, once again, it is a fact that the weak triumph: it is even the essence of fact. Forces can only be judged if one takes into account in the first place their active or reactive quality, in the second place the affinity of this quality for the corresponding pole of the will to power (affirmative or negative) and in the third place the nuance of quality that the force presents at a particular moment of its development, in relation to its affinity. Thus reactive force is: 1) utilitarian force of adaptation and partial limitation; 2) force which separates active force from what it can do, which denies active force (triumph of the weak or the slaves); 3) force separated from what it can do, which denies or turns against itself (reign of the weak or of slaves). And, analogously, active force is: 1) plastic, dominant and subjugating force; 2) force which goes to the limit of what it can do; 3) force which affirms its difference, which makes its difference an object of enjoyment and affirmation. Forces are only concretely and completely determined if these three pairs of characteristics are taken into account simultaneously.

11. Will to Power and Feeling of Power

We know that the will to power is the differential element, the

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genealogical element which determines the relation of force with force and produces their quality. The will to power must therefore *manifest itself* in force as such. The manifestations of the will to power must be studied very carefully because the dynamism of forces is completely dependent on it. But what does "the will to power manifests itself" mean? The relationship between forces in each case is determined to the extent that each force is *affected* by other, inferior or superior, forces. It follows that will to power is manifested as a capacity for being affected. This capacity is not an abstract possibility, it is necessarily fulfilled and actualised at each moment by the other forces to which a given force relates. We should not be surprised by the double aspect of the will to power: from the standpoint of the genesis or production of forces it determines the relation between forces but, from the standpoint of its own manifestations, it is determined by relating forces. This is why the will to power is always determined at the same time as it determines, qualified at the same time as it qualifies. In the first place, therefore, the will to power is manifested as the capacity for being affected, as the determinate capacity of force for being affected. – It is difficult to deny a Spinozist inspiration here. Spinoza, in an extremely profound theory, wanted a capacity for being affected to correspond to every quantity of force. The more ways a body could be affected the more force it had. This capacity measures the force of a body or expresses its power. And, on the one hand, this power is not a simple logical possibility for it is actualised at every moment by the bodies to which a given body is related. On the other hand, this capacity is not a physical passivity, the only passive affects are those not adequately caused by the given body.¹⁸

Similarly, for Nietzsche, the capacity for being affected is not necessarily a passivity but an *affectivity*, a sensibility, a sensation. It is in this sense that Nietzsche, even before elaborating the concept of the will to power and giving it its full significance, was already speaking of a *feeling of power*. Before treating power as a matter of will he treated it as a matter of feeling and sensibility. But when he had elaborated the full concept of the will to power this first characteristic did not disappear – it became the manifestation of the will to power. This is why Nietzsche always says that the will to power is "the primitive affective form" from which all other feelings derive (VP II 42). Or – better still: "The will to power is not a being not a becoming, but a *pathos*" (VP II 311/WP 635). That is to say: the will to power manif-

ests itself as the sensibility of force; the differential element of forces manifests itself as their differential sensibility. "The fact is that the will to power rules even in the inorganic world, or rather that there is no inorganic world. Action at a distance cannot be eliminated, for one thing attracts another and a thing feels itself attracted. This is the fundamental fact . . . In order for the will to power to be able to manifest itself it needs to perceive the things it sees and feel the approach of what is assimilable to it" (VP II 89). The effects of force are active insofar as the force appropriates anything that resists it and compels the obedience of inferior forces. When force is affected by superior forces which it obeys its affects are made to submit, or rather, they are acted (*agies*). Again, obeying is a manifestation of the will to power. But an inferior force can bring about the disintegration or splitting of superior forces, the explosion of the energy which they have accumulated. Nietzsche likes to compare the phenomena of atomic disintegration, the division of protoplasm and the reproduction of organic life (VP II 45, 77, 187). And not only do disintegration, division and separation always express will to power but so do being disintegrated, being separated and being divided: "Division appears as the consequence of the will to power" (VP II 73). Given two forces, one superior and the other inferior, we can see how each one's capacity for being affected is fulfilled necessarily. But this capacity for being affected is not fulfilled unless the corresponding force enters into a history or a process of sensible becoming: 1) active force, power of acting or commanding; 2) reactive force, power of obeying or of being acted; 3) developed reactive force, power of splitting up, dividing and separating; 4) active force become reactive, power of being separated, of turning against itself.¹⁹

All sensibility is only a becoming of forces. There is a cycle of force in the course of which force "becomes" (for example, active force becomes reactive). There are even several becomings of forces that can struggle against one another.²⁰ Thus it is not sufficient to parallel or oppose the respective characteristics of active and reactive force. The active and the reactive are qualities of force that derive from the will to power. But the will to power itself has qualities, *sensibilia*, which are like the becomings of forces. The will to power manifests itself, in the first place, as the sensibility of forces and, in the second place, as the becoming sensible of forces: pathos is the most elementary fact from which a becoming arises (VP II 311/WP 635). In general, the

becoming of forces must not be confused with the qualities of force: it is the becoming of these qualities themselves, the quality of the will to power itself. The qualities of force can no more be abstracted from their becoming than force itself can be abstracted from the will to power. The concrete study of forces necessarily implies a dynamic.

12. The Becoming-Reactive of Forces

But, the dynamic of forces in fact leads us to a distressing conclusion. When reactive force separates active force from what it can do, the latter also becomes reactive. Active forces become reactive. And the word 'becoming' must be taken in the strongest sense: the becoming of forces appears as a becoming-reactive. Are there no other ways of becoming? The fact remains that we do not feel, experience or know any becoming but becoming-reactive. We are not merely noting the existence of reactive forces, we are noting the fact that everywhere they are triumphant. How do they triumph? Through the will to nothingness, thanks to the affinity between reaction and negation. What is negation? It is a quality of the will to power, the one which qualifies it as nihilism or will to nothingness, the one which constitutes the becoming-reactive of forces. It must not be said that active force becomes reactive because reactive forces triumph; on the contrary, they triumph because, by separating active force from what it can do, they betray it to the will of nothingness, to a becoming-reactive deeper than themselves. This is why the figures of triumph of reactive forces (ressentiment, bad conscience, and the ascetic ideal) are primarily forms of nihilism. The becoming-reactive, the becoming nihilistic, of force seem to be essential components of the relation of force with force. – Is there another becoming? Everything tempts us to think that perhaps there is. But, as Nietzsche often says, we would need another sensibility, another way of feeling. We can not yet reply to this question, we can hardly even contemplate its possibility. But we can ask why we only feel and know a becoming-reactive. Is it not because man is essentially reactive? Because becoming-reactive is constitutive of man? Ressentiment, bad conscience and nihilism are not psychological traits but the foundation of the humanity in man. They are the principle of human being as such. Man, "skin disease" of the Earth, reaction of the Earth . . . (Z II "Of Great Events"). It is in this sense that Zarathustra speaks of his "great contempt" for man and of

his "great disgust". Another sensibility, another becoming – would they still be man's?

This condition of man is of the greatest importance for the eternal return. It seems to compromise or contaminate it so gravely that it becomes an object of anguish, repulsion and disgust. Even if active forces return they will again become reactive, eternally reactive. The eternal return of reactive forces and furthermore the return of the becoming-reactive of forces. Zarathustra not only presents the thought of the eternal return as mysterious and secret but as nauseating and difficult to bear (cf. also VP IV 235, 246). The first exposition of the eternal return is followed by a strange vision of a shepherd "writhing, choking, convulsed, his face distorted", a heavy black snake hanging out of his mouth (Z III "Of the Vision and the Riddle" p. 180). Later, Zarathustra himself explains the vision: "The great disgust at man – it choked me and had crept into my throat . . . The man of whom you are weary, the little man recurs eternally . . . Alas man recurs eternally! . . . And eternal return, even for the smallest – that was my disgust at all existence! Ah, disgust! Disgust! Disgust!" (Z III "The Convalescent" pp. 235–6). The eternal return of the mean, small, reactive man not only makes the thought of the eternal return unbearable, it also makes the eternal return itself impossible; it puts contradiction into the eternal return. The snake is an animal of the eternal return; but, insofar as the eternal return is that of reactive forces, the snake uncoils, becomes a "heavy black snake" and hangs out of the mouth which is preparing to speak. For how could the eternal return, the being of becoming, be affirmed of a becoming nihilistic? – In order to affirm the eternal return it is necessary to bite off and spit out the snake's head. Then the shepherd is no longer either man or shepherd, "he was transformed, surrounded with light, he was laughing! Never yet on earth had any man laughed as he laughed" (Z III "Of the Vision and the Riddle" p. 180*). Another becoming, another sensibility: the Overman.

13. Ambivalence of Sense and of Values

A becoming-active of forces, a becoming-active of reactive forces, would be a different becoming from the one that we know now. The evaluation of such a becoming raises several questions and must be the final test of the systematic coherence of Nietzschean concepts in the

theory of force. – Let us consider an initial hypothesis. What Nietzsche calls an active force is one which goes to the limit of its consequences. An active force separated from what it can do by reactive force thus becomes reactive. But does not this reactive force, in its own way, go to the limit of what it can do? If active force, being separated, becomes reactive, does not, conversely, reactive force, as that which separates, become active? Is this not its own way of being active? Concretely, is there not a kind of baseness, meanness, stupidity etc. which becomes active through going to the limit of what it can do? "Rigorous and grandiose stupidity . . ." Nietzsche writes (BGE 188). This hypothesis recalls the Socratic objection but is, in fact, distinct from it. One no longer says, like Socrates, that inferior forces only triumph by forming a greater force but rather that reactive forces only triumph by going to the limit of their consequences, that is, by forming an active force.

A reactive force can certainly be considered from different points of view. Illness for example, separates me from what I can do, as reactive force it makes me reactive, it narrows my possibilities and condemns me to a diminished milieu to which I can do no more than adapt myself. But, in another way, it reveals to me a new capacity, it endows me with a new will that I can make my own, going to the limit of a strange power. (This extreme power brings many things into play, for example: "Looking from the perspective of the sick toward healthier concepts and values . . ." EH I 1 p. 223). Here we can recognise an ambivalence important to Nietzsche: all the forces whose reactive character he exposes are, a few lines or pages later, admitted to fascinate him, to be sublime because of the perspective they open up for us and because of the disturbing will to power to which they bear witness. They separate us from our power but at the same time they give us another power, "dangerous" and "interesting". They bring us new feelings and teach us new ways of being affected. There is something admirable in the becoming-reactive of forces, admirable and dangerous. Not only the sick man, but even the religious man present this double aspect: reactive on the one hand, possessing a new power on the other.²¹ "Human history would be altogether too stupid a thing without the spirit that the impotent have introduced into it" (GM I 7 p. 33). Every time Nietzsche speaks of Socrates, Christ, Judaism, Christianity or any form of decadence or degeneration he discovers this same ambivalence of things, beings and forces.

Is it, however, exactly the same force that both separates me from what I can do and endows me with a new power? Is it the same illness, is it the same invalid who is the slave of his illness and who uses it as a means of exploring, dominating and being powerful. Is the religion of the faithful who are like bleating lambs and that of certain priests who are like new "birds of prey" the same? In fact the reactive forces are not the same and they change nuance depending on the extent to which they develop their affinity for the will to nothingness. One reactive force both obeys and resists, another separates active force from what it can do; a third contaminates active force, carries it along to the limit of becoming-reactive, into the will to nothingness; a fourth type of reactive force was originally active but became reactive and separated from its power, it was then dragged into the abyss and turned against itself – these are the different nuances, affects and types that the genealogist must interpret, that no one else knows how to interpret. "Need I say after all this that in questions of decadence I am experienced? I have spelled them forward and backward. That filigree art of grasping and comprehending in general, those fingers for nuances, that psychology of 'looking round the corner', and whatever else is characteristic of me . . ." (EH I 1 p. 223). The problem of interpretation is to interpret the state of reactive forces in each case – that is the degree of development that they have reached in relation to negation and the will to nothingness. – The same problem of interpretation would arise on the side of active forces; to interpret their nuance or state in each case, that is, to interpret the degree of development of the relation between action and affirmation. There are reactive forces that become grandiose and fascinating by following the will to nothingness and there are active forces that subside because they do not know how to follow the powers of affirmation (we will see that this is the problem of what Nietzsche calls "culture" or "the higher man"). Finally, evaluation presents ambivalences which are even more profound than those of interpretation. To judge affirmation itself from the standpoint of negation itself and negation from the standpoint of affirmation; to judge affirmative will from the standpoint of nihilistic will and nihilistic will from the standpoint of affirmative will – this is the genealogist's art and the genealogist is a physician. "Looking from the perspective of the sick toward healthier concepts and values and, conversely, looking again from the fullness and self-assurance of a rich life down into the secret work of the

instinct of decadence" (EHI I p. 223). But whatever the ambivalence of sense and values we cannot conclude that a reactive force becomes active by going to the limit of what it can do. For, to go "to the limit", "to the ultimate consequences", has two senses depending on whether one affirms or denies, whether one affirms one's own difference or denies that which differs. When a reactive force develops to its ultimate consequences it does this in relation to negation, to the will to nothingness which serves as its motive force. Becoming active, on the contrary, presupposes the affinity of action and affirmation; in order to become active it is not sufficient for a force to go to the limit of what it can do, it must make what it can do an object of affirmation. Becoming-active is affirming and affirmative, just as becoming-reactive is negating and nihilistic.

14. Second Aspect of the Eternal Return: as ethical and selective thought

Because it is neither felt nor known, a becoming-active can only be thought as the product of a selection. A simultaneous double selection by the activity of force and the affirmation of the will. But what can perform the selection? What serves as the selective principle? Nietzsche replies: the eternal return. Formerly the object of disgust, the eternal return overcomes disgust and turns Zarathustra into a "convalescent", someone consoled (Z III "The Convalescent"). But in what sense is the eternal return selective? Firstly because, as a thought, it gives the will a practical rule (VP IV 229, 231/WP 1053, 1056 "The great selectivethought"). The eternal return gives the will a rule as rigorous as the Kantian one. We have noted that the eternal return, as a physical doctrine, was the new formulation of the speculative synthesis. As an ethical thought the eternal return is the new formulation of the practical synthesis: *whatever you will, will it in such a way that you also will its eternal return*. "If, in all that you will you begin by asking yourself: is it certain that I will to do it an infinite number of times? This should be your most solid centre of gravity" (VP IV 242). One thing in the world disheartens Nietzsche: the little compensations, the little pleasures, the little joys and everything that one is granted once, only once. Everything that can be done again the next day only on the condition that it be said the day before: tomorrow I will give it up – the whole ceremonial of the obsessed. And we are like those old women who permit themselves an excess only once, we

act and think like them. "Oh, that you would put from you all *half* willing, and decide upon lethargy as you do upon action. Oh that you understood my saying: 'Always do what you will – but first be such as *can* will!' ".²² Laziness, stupidity, baseness, cowardice or spitefulness that would will its own eternal return would no longer be the same laziness, stupidity etc. How does the eternal return perform the selection here? It is the *thought* of the eternal return that selects. It makes willing something whole. The thought of the eternal return eliminates from willing everything which falls outside the eternal return, it makes willing a creation, it brings about the equation "willing = creating".

It is clear that such a selection falls short of Zarathustra's ambitions. It is content to eliminate certain reactive states, certain states of reactive forces which are among the least developed. But reactive forces which go to the limit of what they can do in their own way, and which find a powerful motor in the nihilistic will, resist the first selection. Far from falling outside the eternal return they enter into it and seem to return with it. We must therefore expect a second selection, very different from the first. But this second selection involves the most obscure parts of Nietzsche's philosophy and forms an almost esoteric element on the doctrine of the eternal return. We can therefore only summarise these Nietzschean themes, leaving a detailed conceptual explanation until later:

1) Why is the eternal return called "the most extreme form of nihilism" (VP III 8/WP 55)? And if the eternal return is the most extreme form of nihilism, nihilism itself (separated or abstracted from the eternal return) is always an "incomplete nihilism" (VP III 7/WP 28): however far it goes, however powerful it is. Only the eternal return makes the nihilistic will whole and complete.

2) The will to nothingness, as we have investigated it up to now, has always appeared in an alliance with reactive forces. Its essence was to deny active force and to lead it to deny and turn against itself. But, at the same time, it laid in this way the foundation for the conservation, triumph and contagion of reactive forces. The will to nothingness was the universal becoming-reactive, the becoming-reactive of forces. This is the sense in which nihilism is always incomplete on its own. Even the ascetic ideal is the opposite of what we might think, "it is an expedient of the art of conserving life". Nihilism is the principle of conservation of a weak, diminished, reactive life. The depreciation

and negation of life form the principle in whose shadow the reactive life conserves itself, survives, triumphs and becomes contagious (GM III 13).

3) What happens when the will to nothingness is related to the eternal return? This is the only place where it breaks its alliance with reactive forces. Only the eternal return can complete nihilism *because it makes negation a negation of reactive forces themselves*. By and in the eternal return nihilism no longer expresses itself as the conservation and victory of the weak but as their destruction, their *self-destruction*. "This perishing takes the form of a self-destruction – the instinctive selection of that which must destroy . . . The will to destruction as the will of a still deeper instinct, the instinct of self-destruction, the will for nothingness" (VP III 8/WP 55). This is why Zarathustra, as early as the Prologue, sings of the "one who wills his own downfall", "for he does not want to preserve himself", "for he will cross the bridge without hesitation" (Z Prologue 4). The Prologue to *Zarathustra* contains the premature secret of the eternal return.

4) Turning against oneself should not be confused with this destruction of self, this self-destruction. In the reactive process of turning against oneself active force becomes reactive. In self-destruction reactive forces are themselves denied and led to nothingness. This is why self-destruction is said to be an active operation an "*active destruction*" (VP III 8, EH III 1). It and it alone expresses the becoming-active of forces: forces become active insofar as reactive forces deny and suppress themselves in the name of a principle which, a short time ago, was still assuring their conservation and triumph. Active negation or active destruction is the state of strong spirits which destroy the reactive in themselves, submitting it to the test of the eternal return and submitting themselves to this test even if it entails willing their own decline; "it is the condition of strong spirits and wills, and these do not find it possible to stop with the negative of 'judgement'; their nature demands *active negation*" (VP III 102/WP 24). This is the only way in which reactive forces *become active*. Furthermore this is why negation, by making itself the negation of reactive forces themselves, is not only active but is, as it were, *transmuted*. It expresses affirmation and becoming-active as the power of affirming. Nietzsche then speaks of the "eternal joy of becoming. . . that joy which includes even joy in destroying", "The affirmation of passing away and *destroying*, which is the decisive feature of a Dionysian philosophy" (EH III "The Birth

of Tragedy" 3 p. 273);

5) The second selection in the eternal return is thus the following: the eternal return produces becoming-active. It is sufficient to relate the will to nothingness to the eternal return in order to realise that reactive forces do not return. However far they go, however deep the becoming-reactive of forces, reactive forces will not return. The small, petty, reactive man will not return. In and through the eternal return negation as a quality of the will to power transmutes itself into affirmation, it becomes an affirmation of negation itself, it becomes a power of affirming, an affirmative power. This is what Nietzsche presents as Zarathustra's cure and Dionysus' secret. "Nihilism vanquished by itself" thanks to the eternal return (VP III). This second selection is very different from the first. It is no longer a question of the simple thought of the eternal return eliminating from willing everything that falls outside this thought but rather, of the eternal return making something come into being which cannot do so without changing nature. It is no longer a question of selective thought but of selective being; for the eternal return is being and being is selection. (Selection = hierarchy)

15. The Problem of the Eternal Return

All this must be taken as a simple summary of texts. These texts will only be elucidated in terms of the following points: the relation of the two qualities of the will to power (negation and affirmation), the relation of the will to power itself with the eternal return, and the possibility of transmutation as a new way of feeling, thinking and above all being (the Overman). In Nietzsche's terminology the reversal of values means the active in place of the reactive (strictly speaking it is the reversal of a reversal, since the reactive began by taking the place of action). But *transmutation* of values, or *transvaluation*, means affirmation instead of negation – negation transformed into a power of affirmation, the supreme Dionysian metamorphosis. All these as yet unanalysed points form the summit of the doctrine of the eternal return.

From afar we can hardly see this summit. The eternal return is the being of becoming. But becoming is double: becoming-active and becoming-reactive, becoming-active of reactive forces and becoming reactive of active forces. But only becoming-active has being; it would

be contradictory for the being of becoming to be affirmed of a becoming-reactive, of a becoming that is itself nihilistic. The eternal return would become contradictory if it were the return of reactive forces. The eternal return teaches us that becoming-reactive has no being. Indeed, it also teaches us of the existence of a becoming-active. It necessarily produces becoming-active by reproducing becoming. This is why affirmation is twofold: the being of becoming cannot be fully affirmed without also affirming the existence of becoming-active. The eternal return thus has a double aspect: it is the universal being of becoming, but the universal being of becoming ought to belong to a single becoming. Only becoming-active has a being which is the being of the whole of becoming. Returning is everything but everything is affirmed in a single moment. Insofar as the eternal return is affirmed as the universal being of becoming, insofar as becoming-active is also affirmed as the symptom and product of the universal eternal return, affirmation changes nuance and becomes more and more profound. Eternal return, as a physical doctrine, affirms the being of becoming. But, as selective ontology, it affirms this being of becoming as the "self-affirming" of becoming-active. We see that, at the heart of the complicity which joins Zarathustra and his animals, a misunderstanding arises, a problem the animals neither understand nor recognise, the problem of Zarathustra's disgust and cure. "O you buffoons and barrel organs! answered Zarathustra and smiled again . . . you - have already made an old song of it" (Z III "The Convalescent" pp. 234-5). The old song is the cycle and the whole, universal being. But the complete formula of affirmation is: the whole, yes, universal being, yes, but universal being ought to belong to a single becoming, the whole ought to belong to a single moment.

3

Critique

I. *Transformation of the Sciences of Man*

In Nietzsche's view the balance sheet of the sciences is a depressing one: passive, reactive and negative concepts predominate everywhere. They always try to interpret phenomena in terms of reactive forces. We have already seen this in the case of physics and biology. But when we look seriously at the sciences of man we see the development of the reactive and negative interpretation of phenomena: "utility", "adaptation", "regulation" and even "forgetting" serve as explanatory concepts (GM I 2). Ignorance of origins and of the genealogy of forces is obvious everywhere - in the sciences of man and even in those of nature. It could be said that the scientist sets up the triumph of reactive forces as his model and wants to chain thought to it. He makes much of his respect for facts and his love of truth. But the "fact" is an interpretation: what type of interpretation? Truth expresses a will: who wills truth? And what does he who says "I am seeking the truth" will? Science today is taking the exploration of nature and man further than ever in a particular direction, but it is also taking submission to the ideal and the established order further than ever. Scholars, even democratic and socialist ones, do not lack piety, they have merely invented a theology which no longer depends on the heart. "Observe the ages in the history of peoples when the scholar steps into the foreground: they are ages of exhaustion, often of evening and decline" (GM III 25 p. 154).

The misrecognition of action, of all that is active, is obvious in the sciences of man: for example, action is judged in terms of its *utility*. It would be precipitate to say that utilitarianism is today an outdated doctrine. In the first place, if this is so it is partly thanks to Nietzsche. Furthermore, a doctrine only lets itself become outdated when it has spread its principles and hidden its postulates in the doctrines which succeed it. Nietzsche asks; what does the concept of utility refer to?

pure affirmation. There is, in transmutation itself, a correlation of affirmations: chance and necessity, becoming and being, multiplicity and unity. What is correlatively affirmed should not be confused with what is denied or suppressed by the transmutation.

23. In two texts of the Will to Power Nietzsche presents the eternal return in a probabilistic perspective and as being deduced from a large number of throws: "If we assume an enormous mass of cases the fortuitous repetition of a single dice throw is more probable than absolute non-identity" (VP II 324); if the world has a definite magnitude of force and time has an infinite duration then "every possible combination would be realised at least once, moreover it would be realised an infinite number of times" (VP II 329). But, 1) these texts only give a "hypothetical" exposition of the eternal return; 2) they are "apologetic" in a sense close to that sometimes given to Pascal's wager. It is a question of taking mechanism at its word, of showing that mechanism arrives at a conclusion which "is not necessarily mechanistic"; 3) they are "polemical" in an aggressive way, it is a question of defeating the bad player on his own ground.
24. It is only in this sense that Nietzsche speaks of "fragments" as "terrible chances" (Z II "Of Redemption").
25. Z I "Of Voluntary Death": "Believe it my brothers! He died too early; he himself would have recanted his teaching had he lived to my age!"
26. VP II 38 (on the steam engine), 50, 60, 61 (on the releasing of forces "Man proves that there are unheard of forces which can be put into action by a small being of a composite nature . . . Beings who play with the stars". "Inside the molecule explosions and changes of direction of all the atoms are produced and sudden unleashings of forces. All our solar system could, in a single brief instant, experience an excitation comparable to that which the nerve exercises on the muscle.")
27. Thibaudet, in *La Poésie de Stéphane Mallarmé*, p. 424, points this out. He rightly ruled out all question of influence.
28. Thibaudet, in a strange passage (433), does point out that, according to Mallarmé, the die is only thrown once; but he seems to regret it, finding the principle of several dice throws clearer: "It is exceedingly doubtful that the development of his

meditation would have led him to write a poem on the theme; several dice throws abolish chance. This is nevertheless certain and clear. We should remember the law of large numbers . . ." It is clear above all that the laws of large numbers would not introduce any development of the meditation but only a misrepresentation. M. Hyppolite has a deeper vision when he compares the Mallarmean dice throw not with the law of large numbers but with the cybernetic machine (cf. *Etudes Philosophiques*, 1958). The same comparison would be valid for Nietzsche following what has been said above.

29. When Nietzsche spoke of the "ascetic justification of existence" it was, on the contrary, a question of art as "stimulant of life": art affirms life, life is affirmed in art.
30. Heidegger stresses these points. For example: "Nihilism moves history like a fundamental process, hardly recognised in the destiny of the peoples of the West. Nihilism is therefore not one historical phenomenon among others, nor a spiritual current which, in the framework of western history, is encountered along with other spiritual currents." "The Word of Nietzsche: 'God is Dead' ", in *The Question Concerning Technology*, (Harper and Row, 1977).
31. EH IV 1: "I am the opposite of a negative spirit. I am a bringer of glad tidings like no one before me."
32. VP I 406: "What do we attack in Christianity? That it wishes to break the strong, to discourage their courage, to use their bad hours and their wearinesses, to transform their proud assurance into uneasiness and torment of conscience . . . A horrible disaster of which Pascal is the most illustrious example."
33. Z III "Of Old and New Law Tables", 4: "Man is something that must be overcome. There are diverse paths and ways to overcoming: just look to it! But only a buffoon thinks: 'Man can also be leapt over'." Z Prologue 4: "I love him who is ashamed when the dice fall in his favour and who then asks: Am I then a cheat?"
34. "The movement of Pascal: *un* monstre et *un* chaos, consequently something to be denied" (VP III 42/WP 83*).

2. Active and Reactive

1. Spinoza, *Ethics*, III 2 Proof: "I have already shown that they know not what a body can do, or what can be deduced from mere

- contemplation of its nature, and that they have known of many things which happen merely by reason of the laws of nature, which they have believed to happen save by the direction of the mind."
2. VP II 173/WP 659: The human body is "a more astonishing idea than the old soul". VP II 226: "What is most surprising is rather the body; one never ceases to be amazed at the idea that the human body has become possible."
 3. On the false problem of a beginning of life, VP II 66 and 68. On the role of chance, VP II 25 and 334.
 4. The originality of Nietzsche's pluralism is found here. In his conception of the organism he does not limit himself to a plurality of constituent forces. What interests him is the diversity of active and reactive forces and the investigation of active forces themselves. Compare this with Butler's pluralism which is admirable but contents itself with memory and habit.
 5. VP II 86 and 87: "In the chemical world the sharpest perception of the difference between forces reigns. But a protoplasm, which is a multiplicity of chemical forces, has only a vague and uncertain perception of a strange reality." "To admit that there are perceptions in the inorganic world, and perceptions of an absolute exactitude; it is here that truth reigns! With the organic world imprecision and appearance begin."
 6. cf. The judgments on Mayer in the letters to Gast.
 7. PTG 4 p. 50: "But then Anaximander sees another question: Why hasn't all that come-to-be passed away long since, since a whole eternity of time has passed? Whence the ever renewed stream of coming-to-be? And from this question he can save himself only by a mystic possibility."
 8. The account of the eternal return in terms of the passing moment is found in Z III "Of the Vision and the Riddle".
 9. VP II 334: "Where would the diversity inside a cycle come from? . . . By admitting that there exists an equal concentration of energy in all the centres of force in the universe, we have to ask how the least suspicion of diversity could arise . . ."
 10. VP II 23/WP 692: "My proposition is: that the will of psychology hitherto is an unjustified generalisation, that this will *does not exist at all*, that instead of grasping the idea of the development of one definite will into many forms, one has eliminated

- the character of the will by subtracting it from its content, its 'whither?' - this is in the highest degree the case with *Schopenhauer*: what he calls 'will' is a mere empty word."
11. Z II "Of Self-Overcoming" p. 137: "How has this come about? Thus I asked myself what persuades the living creature to obey and to command and to practise obedience even in commanding? Listen now to my teaching you wisest men! Test in earnest whether I have crept into the heart of life itself and down to the roots of its heart!
Where I found a living creature, there I found will to power; and even in the will of the servant I found the will to be master" (cf. VP II 91).
 - 12*. (*Translator's note*: The word *divers* which is translated here as "diversity" could also be translated by the word used by Kant's English translators - "manifold" - in "Kantian" contexts such as the present one. I have retained "diversity" which is more appropriate in most contexts but the Kantian connotation should be borne in mind.)
On these problems which are posed following Kant, cf. M. Guéroult, *La Philosophie Transcendentale de Salomon Maimon*, *La Doctrine de la Science chez Fichte*, and M. Vuillemin, *L'Heritage Kantien et la révolution Copernicienne*.
 13. GM Preface 6 p. 20: "We need a *critique* of moral values, *the value of these values themselves must first be called in question*."
 14. The theory of values moves further and further away from its origins insofar as it loses sight of the principle "to evaluate = to create". The Nietzschean inspiration is revived in researches like those of M. Polin concerning the creation of values. However, from Nietzsche's point of view, the correlative of the creation of values can, in no case, be their contemplation but must be rather the radical critique of all "current" values.
 15. GM I 10 p. 36: Instead of affirming themselves and having denial as a simple consequence, reactive forces begin by denying what is different from themselves, from the start they are opposed to whatever is not part of themselves.
 16. On the English conception of genealogy as evolution: GM Preface 7 and I 1-4. On the mediocrity of this kind of English thought: BGE 253. On the German conception of genealogy as evolution and its mediocrity: GS 357 and BGE 244.

17. VP II 85: "We note that in chemistry every body extends its power as far as it is able." VP II 374/WP 634: "There is no law: every power draws its ultimate consequence at every moment." VP II 369/WP 630: "I beware of speaking of chemical 'laws': that savours of morality. It is far rather a question of the absolute establishment of power relationships."
18. If our interpretation is accurate Spinoza saw, before Nietzsche, that a force is inseparable from a capacity for being affected and that this capacity expresses its power. Nietzsche is nevertheless critical of Spinoza, but on another point: Spinoza was not able to elevate himself to the conception of a will to power. He confused power with simple force and conceived of force in a reactive way (cf. *conatus* and conservation).
19. VP II 171/WP 712: "This highest force, which, turning against itself when it no longer has anything left to organise, expends its force on disintegration."
20. VP II 170/WP 617: "Instead of 'cause and effect' the mutual struggle of that which becomes, often with the absorption of one's opponent; the number of becoming elements are not constant."
21. GM I 6 p. 33: "It was on the soil of this essentially dangerous form of human existence, the priestly form, that man first became an interesting animal, that only here did the human soul in a higher sense acquire depth and become evi! . . ." On the ambivalence of the priest, GM III 15 p. 126*: "He must be sick himself, he must be profoundly related to the sick – how else would they understand each other? – but he must also be strong, master of himself even more than of others, above all unshakeable in his will to power, so as to be trusted and feared by the sick . . ."
22. Z III "Of the Virtue that makes small" p. 191; II, "Of the Compassionate" p. 113: "But worst of all are petty thoughts. Truly, better even to have done wickedly than to have thought pettily! To be sure, you will say: 'Delight in petty wickedness spares us many a great evil deed.'" But here one should not wish to be spared."

3. Critique

1. GM III 23–25. On the psychology of the scholar, BGE 206–207.

- 2*. Translator's note: The expression translated here as "means" is *veut dire*, literally "wants or wills to say". The French sentence reads "un mot ne veut dire quelque chose que dans la mesure où celui qui le dit veut quelque chose en le disant", relating "willing to say" to "willing something" in a way which cannot be simply translated into English. Throughout this translation I have used both "wills" and "wants" for *vouloir* and its derivatives.
- 3*. Translator's note: Deleuze's exposition of Nietzsche's change in the "form of the question" is central to his interpretation. The change hinges on the difference, in French, between the questions *qu'est-ce que?* and *qui?* This would usually be translated as the difference between the questions "what?" and "who?" But the word *qui?* has a wider sense than the English "who?", picking out particulars of all kinds not just persons. Deleuze suggested translating *qui?* as "which (one)?" since "it is never a person" that is being asked for. He discusses "the form of the question" in the Conclusion and also in the Preface to the English translation.
4. WS Sketch for a Preface, 10 (French translation, Albert, p. 226).
- 5*. Translator's note: The French word *instance* has a range of senses rather different from the English word – including both "insistence" and "authority" and excluding the sense of "example" which the word has in English. The different senses have been played on by a number of recent French philosophical writers in ways which are very difficult to translate and it has become common practice to retain the word in English.
6. This is always Nietzsche's method, in all his books. It is presented in an especially systematic manner in GM.
7. Z Prologue 3 p. 42: "The Overman is the meaning of the earth. Let your will say: The Overman shall be the meaning of the Earth!" Z III "Of the Spirit of Gravity" p. 210: "He who will one day teach men to fly will have moved all boundary stones; all boundary stones will themselves fly into the air to him, he will baptise the earth anew – as 'the weightless'".
8. BGE 261. On the "aspiration to distinction" cf. D 113: "He who aspires to distinction has his eye ceaselessly on his neighbour and wants to know what his feelings are; but the sympathy and